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sure sign of a dysfunctional market economy
is the persistence of unemployment. In the
United States today, one out of six workers who
would like a full-time job can’t find one. It is an
economy with huge unmet needs and yet vast
idle resources.
The housing market is another U.S. anom-
aly: there are hundreds of thousands of home-
less people (more than 1.5 million Americans spent at least one night in
a shelter in 2009), while hundreds of thousands of houses sit vacant.
Indeed, the foreclosure rate is increasing. Two million Americans
lost their homes in 2008, and 2.8 million more in 2009, but the numbers
are expected to be even higher in 2010. Our financial markets performed
dismally—well-performing, “rational” markets do not lend to people
who cannot or will not repay—and yet those running these markets were
rewarded as if they were financial geniuses.
None of this is news. What is news is the Obama administration’s
reluctant and belated recognition that its efforts to get the housing and
mortgage markets working again have largely failed. Curiously, there is
a growing consensus on both the left and the right that the government
will have to continue propping up the housing market for the foresee-
able future. This stance is perplexing and possibly dangerous.
It is perplexing because in conventional analyses of which activi-
ties should be in the public domain, running the national mortgage mar-
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ket is never mentioned. Mastering the specific information
related to assessing creditworthiness and monitoring the
performance of loans is precisely the kind of thing at
which the private sector is supposed to excel.
It is, however, an understandable position: both U.S.
political parties supported policies that encouraged exces-
sive investment in housing and excessive leverage, while
free-market ideology dissuaded regulators from interven-
ing to stop reckless lending. If the government were to
walk away now, real-estate prices would fall even further,
banks would come under even greater financial stress, and
the economy’s short-run prospects would become bleaker.
But that is precisely why a government-managed
mortgage market is dangerous. Distorted interest rates,
official guarantees, and tax subsidies encourage contin-
ued investment in real estate, when what the economy
needs is investment in, say, technology and clean energy.
Moreover, continuing investment in real estate makes
it all the more difficult to wean the economy off its real-
estate addiction, and the real-estate market off its addiction
to government support. Supporting further real-estate
investment would make the sector’s value even more
dependent on government policies, ensuring that future
policymakers face greater political pressure from interest
groups like real-estate developers and bond holders.
Current U.S. policy is befuddled, to say the least. The
Federal Reserve Board is no longer the lender of last
resort, but the lender of first resort. Credit risk in the mort-
gage market is being assumed by the government, and
market risk by the Fed. No one should be surprised at
what has now happened: the private market has essen-
tially disappeared.
The government has announced that these measures,
which work (if they do work) by lowering interest rates,
are temporary. But that means that when intervention
comes to an end, interest rates will rise—and any holder
of mortgage-backed bonds would experience a capital
loss—potentially a large one.
No private party would buy such an asset. By con-
trast, the Fed doesn’t have to recognize the loss; while
free- market advocates might talk about the virtues of mar-
ket pricing and “price discovery,” the Fed can pretend that
nothing has happened.
With the government assuming credit risk, mortgages
become as safe as government bonds of comparable matu-
rity. Hence, the Fed’s intervention in the housing market
is really an intervention in the government bond market;
the purported “switch” from buying mortgages to buying
government bonds is of little significance. The Fed is
engaged in the difficult task of trying to set not just the
short-term interest rate, but longer-term rates as well.
Resuscitating the housing market is all the more dif-
ficult for two reasons. First, the banks that used to do con-
ventional mortgage lending are in bad financial shape.
Second, the securitization model is badly broken and not
likely to be replaced anytime soon. Unfortunately, neither
the Obama administration nor the Fed seems willing to
face these realities.
Securitization—putting large numbers of mortgages
together to be sold to pension funds and investors around
the world—worked only because there were rating agen-
cies that were trusted to ensure that mortgage loans were
given to people who would repay them. Today, no one
will or should trust the rating agencies, or the investment
banks that purveyed flawed products (sometimes design-
ing them to lose money).
In short, government policies to support the housing
market not only have failed to fix the problem, but are
prolonging the deleveraging process and creating the con-
ditions for Japanese-style malaise. Avoiding this dismal
“new normal” will be difficult, but there are alternative
policies with far better prospects of returning the U.S. and
the global economy to prosperity.
Corporations have learned how to take bad news in
stride, write down losses, and move on, but our govern-
ments have not. For one out of four U.S. mortgages, the
debt exceeds the home’s value. Evictions merely create
more homeless people and more vacant homes. What is
needed is a quick write-down of the value of the mort-
gages. Banks will have to recognize the losses and, if nec-
essary, find the additional capital to meet reserve
requirements.
This, of course, will be painful for banks, but their
pain will be nothing in comparison to the suffering they
have inflicted on people throughout the rest of the global
economy. ◆
What is news is the Obama
administration’s reluctant and belated
recognition that its efforts to get 
the housing and mortgage markets
working again have largely failed. 
Copyright of International Economy is the property of International Economy Publishing Inc. and its content
may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express
written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.
